Abstract This paper focuses on instructions and procedures as the reasons that subjects fail to behave according to the predictions of game theory in two-person "guessing game" (beauty contest game) experiments. In this game, two individuals simultaneously choose a number between 0 and 100. The winner is the person whose chosen number is the closest to 2/3 of the average of the two numbers. The weakly dominant strategy is zero. Because of the simplicity of the game, the widespread failure of subjects to choose the weakly dominant strategy has been interpreted as evidence of some fundamental inability to behave strategically. By contrast, we find that subjects' behavior reflects a lack of understanding of the game form, which we define as the relationships between possible choices, outcomes and payoffs. To a surprising degree, subjects seem to have little understanding of the experimental environment in which they are participating. If subjects do not understand the game form, the experimental control needed for testing game theory is lost. The experiments reported here demonstrate that the failure to act strategically is related to how the game is presented. We test how well subjects are able to recognize the game under a variety of different presentations of the game. Some subjects fail to recognize the game form when it is presented abstractly. When the game is transformed into a simple isomorphic game and presented in a familiar context, subjects do choose weakly dominant strategies. While our results confirm the ability of subjects to make strategic decisions, they also emphasize the need to understand the limitations of experimental subjects' ability to grasp the game as the experimenter intends. Given these limitations, we provide suggestions for better experimental control.
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Introduction
Evidence from the two person guessing game 1 (a "beauty contest" game) demonstrates a widespread failure of individuals to choose a weakly dominating strategy (Grosskopf and Nagel 2008 from now on GN). The game appears simple once it is understood. Two people are instructed to simultaneously choose a number between 0 and 100. The chosen numbers are revealed and the winner is the person whose chosen number is the closest to 2/3 of the average of the two numbers. The weakly dominant strategy is zero but frequently it is not chosen. The behavior has been interpreted as a clear rejection of game theory.
The failure of game theory has been attributed by GN to a cognitive bias in which people underestimate their own influence on the outcome of a game. Indeed, the authors suggest that this underestimation bias, if wide-spread, might replace game theory as an explanation of over-crowding and congestion. Our results support a more optimistic outlook for game theory. We demonstrate that the absence of appropriate strategic behavior is not due to an inability to think or act strategically. Subjects fail to behave strategically because, to a surprising degree, they are substantially unaware of important elements of the experimental environment.
Game theory rests on the concept of a game form, which we define as: (1) the sets of strategies available to participants, (2) the information conditions, (3) the relationship between strategy choices and outcomes, and (4) the relationships between outcomes and payoffs. "Lack of recognition" can refer to any or all of these elements. 2 While one might refer to the game form as "the rules of the game" such shorthand abstracts from important detail. The game form has several related elements. Lack of awareness or misconceptions about any one of the elements might come from many sources. We use the broader concept of a game form in order to capture what we see. Game theory and related solution concepts assume that participants recognize important elements of the environment, i.e. the game form. Thus, if
